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Abstract 
 
 
The paper develops two synthetic measures at the HS-10 level to depict effective 
market access for a country receiving preferential access and applies these to the 
market access ASEAN members would receive on impact following the 
implementation of an FTA with the EU.  First, the measures show that current 
effective market access for ASEAN EBA members is cut in half by the preferences 
granted by the EU to countries that compete with these countries in the EU markets. 
Second, the measures show that about one quarter of the preferential margin under 
the proposed FTA for EBA members would be lost as a result of preferential access 
granted to ASEAN GSP members.  Third, disaggregated estimates of the 
restrictiveness of rules of origin confirm that rules are more restrictive for products 
with higher preferential margins and that ASEAN countries usually face tougher rules 
of origin in the EU because of the composition of their exports. 
 
 
JEL classification: F13, F15 
 
Keywords: Market Access, Rules of Origin, preferential trade agreements, ASEAN 
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1 Introduction 
 
In May 2007, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Economic 
Ministers and the European Union Commission agreed to enter into free trade area 
(FTA) negotiations on a region-to-region instead of a bilateral approach that would 
take into account the different levels of development of ASEAN members. These 
negotiations were launched against a backdrop of falling trade shares between the 
two regions (according to the ASEAN statistical yearbook, the EU share of the 
ASEAN-6 exports fell from 15.3% in 2001 to 13.2 in 2004 while the corresponding 
ASEAN import shares fell from 12.6% to 11.3%)1. If there is more to the FTA signing 
than market access, trading on a preferential basis with one’s main trading partners 
remains among the main objectives on both sides and this was clearly mentioned 
when negotiations were launched. In brief, like other FTAs recently negotiated 
around the world, one of the intents of the EU and ASEAN in their negotiations is to 
level the playing field and exchange market access at the expense of other trading 
partners.  
 
                     
1
 The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established in 1967 by five founding 
members (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand). It currently has 10 members 
(dates of membership in parenthesis): Brunei Darussalam (1984), Cambodia (1999) Lao (1997), 
Myanmar (1997) and Vietnam (1995).  It has a population of 560 million which is slightly larger than 
the 460 million for the European Union (EU-25). Valued at market exchange rates of 2006 and 
adjusted for Purchasing Price Parity (PPP), the respective GDP of ASEAN and EU-25 were 2 800 
billion and 12,000 billion US$ respectively. 
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Also, like the majority of countries around the world, the EU and the ASEAN 
members are actively participating in several preferential trading arrangements. They 
also belong to the World Trade Organization (except for Laos). Most ASEAN 
members also receive non-preferential market access under the Generalized System 
of Preferences (GSP) scheme from Canada, the European Union (EU), Japan and the 
United-States. In all these instances, benefiting from market access requires proving 
origin which itself is costly and reduces the benefits from that market access. In their 
negotiations with the EU, from the point of view of expected penetration to the EU 
market, the key issue facing ASEAN members is how much access can they expect 
from entering a FTA?  This will depend on several dimensions of EU trade policy, 
including their tariff policy towards other trading partners and the Rules of Origin 
(RoO) in place. Both effects can be quantified and, as shown in this paper, 
disaggregated quantification alters substantially the picture of effective market access 
provided by the standard unadjusted measures used in the negotiations. 
 
Ex-ante, partial or general equilibrium analysis in a multi-country setting is the 
preferred tool to measure the extent of market access resulting from trade policy 
changes. For example, in their evaluation of the likely effects on market access and 
welfare of an ASEAN-EU FTA, CEPII –CIREM (2006), use a general equilibrium 
world model with 12 regions and 33 sectors. On the basis of a carefully calibrated 
model in which trade restrictions (other than NTBs on trade in goods) are aggregated 
from detailed data at the HS6-level into average tariff equivalents (AVE) that 
incorporate the effects of specific tariffs and tariff-rate quotas, the study concludes 
that all ASEAN countries would gain in terms of welfare from the FTA, notably 
because of the differential market structure assumed across sectors. With increasing 
returns to scale assumed for industry and constant returns to scale in other sectors, 
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trade integration with the EU would lead to a shift of resources towards industry 
resulting in increased scale efficiency.2 
 
While useful, the level of aggregation in these studies masks the differential impact of 
similar preferential access across partners. Considering that, on average each country 
around the world is engaged in 5 preferential agreements and that the extent of 
multi-country membership is increasing rapidly with up to 20% of positive MFN 
tariffs covered by preferential trading agreements (World Bank 2005), it is useful to 
develop measures that capture the impact of preferential schemes on market access. 
This is the objective of this paper.  
 
The paper develops two synthetic measures to depict effective market access for a 
country receiving preferential access and applies these to the market access ASEAN 
members would receive on impact (i.e. before adjustment takes place in product and 
factor markets) following the implementation of an FTA with the EU . First we use a 
more complete measure of preferential access by taking into account that trading 
partners  grant market access to many other partners as well (especially in the case of 
the EU but also for other developed countries) so that the effective market access is 
less than the difference between the MFN and the preferential tariff. Second, we rely 
on recent work measuring the restrictiveness of requirements to establish origin (i.e. 
Rules of Origin) to qualify further the extent of actual market access under a 
                     
2 Changes in model closure can of course isolate the importance of such built-in market structure 
effects. Also some simulations models have incorporated the effects of RoO (see e.g. Francois, 
Hoekman and Manchin (2006).  Gravity models are also used routinely to quantify market access ex-
post, with dummy variables used to control for membership in a PTA (e.g. Carrère, 2006) sometimes 
augmented by an index for the severity of rules of origin (e.g. Augier et al., 2005). 
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preferential market arrangement.  Key to the contribution is that these measures are 
constructed at the most disaggregated level possible, i.e. HS-10 for EU tariffs and HS-
6 level for EU Rules of Origin (RoO). While at this high level of disaggregation 
analysis is descriptive, it minimizes biases resulting from aggregation and serves as a 
complement to the other approaches used to measure preferential market access. The 
paper thus concentrates on developing ways to condense and convey that 
disaggregated information.  
 
When applied to the proposed ASEAN-EU FTA, these measures reveal quite a 
different picture than one that would be gleaned from the more aggregate approaches 
mentioned above. To summarize the main results, our impact measures show that 
current effective market access for ASEAN EBA members is cut in half by the 
preferences granted by the EU to countries that compete with these countries in the 
EU markets. We also show that the proposed FTA to the EU would lead to gains in 
access for some partners and to losses for others within the ASEAN group, that 
“significant” preferential margins are almost always for products that account for less 
than 1/10 of 1 percent of exports (at the HS-10 level). About one quarter of the 
preferential margin under the proposed FTA for EBA members would be lost as a 
result of preferential access granted to ASEAN GSP members. .Disaggregated 
calculations on the restrictiveness of rules of origin not only confirm that rules are 
more restrictive for products with higher preferential margins, but also that, for a 
given preferential margin in the EU market, due to the product composition of their 
exports to the EU, ASEAN countries usually face tougher rules of origin in the EU. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the situation of the different 
ASEAN members in the trading system. Section 3 introduces the preferential access 
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measures that are applied at the Hs-10 level in section 4. Section 5 brings in rules of 
origin and section 6 concludes 
 
 
2. ASEAN countries in the EU trading system  
 
Except for Singapore, all ASEAN members get some preferential access to developed-
country markets. In terms of preferential access, it would appear that the EU is the 
most generous since it gives the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and free-
trade status (with the “Everything but Arms” –EBA –scheme) to the three low-
income countries, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. The EU has trade agreements with 
virtually all countries in the world. These agreements fall under three layers (number 
of countries in parenthesis and [ASEAN members in brackets]). 
 
The most preferred group. This group benefits from a trade agreement that is 
superior to the standard GSP(92). It includes not only Cotonou (21) and (non-
Cotonou) EBA(9) [Cambodia, Lao, Myanmar] members, but also the EU’s regional 
and bilateral trade agreements with its neighbors, Turkey, EUROMED countries, and 
countries further away like South Africa, Chile, and Mexico. Finally, the EPA 
negotiations covering ACP countries and scheduled for completion in the near future 
also belong to this group. 
The middle group. This is the GSP(92) [Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Thailand and Vietnam] group that is party to the standard GSP preferences but of no 
other regime. As shown in table 1, these preferences are less than those accruing to 
the “inner circle” above. 
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The least preferred group. This group comprises the industrialized countries 
[Singapore] that trades with the EU on a MFN basis. 
 
This categorization of EU preferences into “three circles” shows that ASEAN 
countries belong in each group and therefore have heterogeneous differential access 
to the EU market under the current trade regime. It is thus clear that the proposed 
FTA with the EU will erode preferences for the low-income countries in ASEAN vis-à-
vis other ASEAN members. In relative terms at least, it is to be expected that there 
will be effective gain in market access for the ASEAN partners that do not get EBA 
status. 
 
Table 1 here: Distribution of Applied Tariffs, HS-10, 2004 
 
The ASEAN group is heterogeneous both in terms of economic size and level of 
development. This diversity is reflected in their exports to the EU. For one group of 
countries including Brunei, Cambodia, Lao, Philippines and Singapore exports to the 
EU are quite concentrated with the top 50 products at the HS-10 level accounting for 
close to ¾ of the export share (see table 1, last column). The other group including 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam is more diversified with the top 50 
products accounting for less than 50% of their export share to the EU. The next-to-
last column indicates the number of tariff lines for which each ASEAN country had 
positive exports to the EU in 2004 (the EU has 12,145 tariff lines at the HS-10 tariff 
level).  
 
It is already clear from table 1 that the potential market access to be gained is 
unevenly distributed across the ASEAN group. For example, Thailand exports to 858 
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tariff lines for which the applied tariff is above 10 percent ad-valorem, while for 
Indonesia the corresponding number is only 84. However, this perception of market 
access is complicated by the fact that the EU grants preferential access to many 
partners. These aspects are taken into account the measures introduced below. 
 
3 Measuring Market Access  
 
Start first with a measure of preferential access for an individual HS-10 level product 
not taking into account preferences granted to other partners. Call this measure the 
unadjusted preferential access measure, iτ  and express it as a percentage of the 
tariff inclusive price (for country k) as: 
, ,
,100
MFN k PREF k
k i i
i PREF k
i
t t
t
τ
−
=
+
 (1) 
ti being the ad-valorem MFN or Preferential tariff (in %) on product i exported by 
country k to the EU market. 
 
As computed in (1), preferential access is measured as the difference (expressed in %) 
between the tariff faced by an MFN exporter and the tariff faced by an ASEAN 
member when it exports to the EU. According to expression(1), as it should be, the 
preferential margin is zero for products with zero MFN tariffs. Thus, on average, 
countries facing exporting products with low MFN tariffs and many zero tariff lines 
(such as Philippines or Malaysia) are unlikely to get much additional preferential 
market access from an FTA, although the FTA could lead to new products being 
exported. This is a more meaningful measure of market access than alternative 
measures such as the percentage change in the tariff faced by ASEAN members or the 
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simple difference in the tariff rate which does not take into account the height of the 
MFN tariff of the preference-granting trade partner. 3 
 
However, as first pointed out by Low et al. (2005), for countries like the EU that 
extend preferential access to many trading partners, one should measure the 
preferential access against the effective tariff paid by all other exporters to the EU at 
that tariff line level. Call this measure for a country  
k and product i, the adjusted preferential access measure kiτ% , (Low et al. call it the 
“competition-based preferential access” measure): 
 
 ( )
( )
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∑
%
 (2) 
M being the import value to EU 
 
Expression (2) recognizes that when computing preferential margins for country k 
and product i, the margin should  be computed on the basis of the effective tariff paid 
                     
3
 To see the difference consider product A where the MFN tariff is 2% and product B where the tariff 
is 50%. In both cases, suppose that the ASEAN country is faced with a tariff that is half the MFN tariff 
rate. Computing preferential access, as the percentage difference in tariffs would yield a 50% 
preferential margin. However, according to(1), for product A, the preferential margin is less than 2% 
while for product B it is evaluated as a 20% preferential margin. Computing the preferential margin as 
the simple difference between MFN and partner tariffs would give a similar measure for preferential 
access when tariff rates are small, though in the case here for product B, the difference is smaller.  
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on the corresponding tariff line i which is the MFN tariff less the EU import share-
weighted imports from other preferential beneficiaries, j  ( j k≠ ).These are 
approximated by the market shares received by ACP, EBA and other beneficiaries of 
bilateral FTAs with the EU (e.g. EuroMed, Chile, South-Africa).  
 
According to this formula, adapted from Low et al. (2005), a country like Singapore 
that pays the MFN tariff receives less preferential access than competing exporters to 
the EU and gets a negative preferential margin, unless all other countries selling to 
the EU for that tariff line are also MFN.  If there is some differentiation, then there is 
competition among recipients of preferences. If however, at this very disaggregated 
level, one considers that goods from different origin are near homogeneous, then as 
long as the EU market is not saturated, then there would be no competition among 
preference receivers and the adjustment proposed by the formula would not be 
necessary or would represent an overstatement of the extent of market access loss.  
 
Finally, to compare the change in preferential market access from implementing an 
FTA with the EU, we aggregate up across products and compare the extent of access 
on the EU market across ASEAN countries. For each country k, the aggregate gain, 
kG , is computed at the HS-10 level and then averaged at the country level, using as 
weight the current export value according to: 
( )k k k ki iFTA iiG θ τ τ= −∑ % %      (3) 
where all gains are expressed in percentage points and : 
 
k
iθ : share of the product i export in total export value of country k; 
k
iτ% : Adjusted preferential access for product i and country k (see equation(2)); 
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k
iFTAτ% : Adjusted preferential access for product i and country k under the ASEAN-EU 
FTA assumption (i.e. assuming a zero applied for the 10 ASEAN countries). 
 
Expressions (1)-(3) will now be evaluated for each ASEAN country’s sales to the EU in 
2004. These expressions are evaluated twice, first to measure current market access, 
then to measure the change in market that would result from the proposed ASEAN-
EU FTA. In computing the adjusted market access, we assume that the EU already 
has FTAs with Mexico, Chile, South-Africa, Turkey and the EuroMed countries, all of 
which are assumed to pay zero tariffs (in reality some products are excluded, but so 
will some product lines be excluded from the ASEAN-EU FTA). 
 
4. Market Access under an ASEAN-EU FTA 
 
Table 2 reports the aggregate value of the measures of actual and potential market 
access by ASEAN members in the EU market computed in the paper. Leaving aside 
for now, the interpretation of the RoO index in column 6, column 1 computes the so-
called “value” of preferential access often used in the literature (e.g. Brenton (2003) 
under the twin assumptions of full utilization of preferences and that the unadjusted 
preferential margin is the correct measure of preferential access. The estimates are 
low, reflecting the low average protection rates facing MFN suppliers in the products 
exported by GSP and EBA beneficiaries (around 3.5% percent). 
 
Table 2 here: Preferential Margins, adjusted and Unadjusted under Different 
Preferential Schemes 
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Turning to the actual preferential margins in columns 2 and 3 several informative 
patterns emerge from the comparison of unadjusted and adjusted margins. First, 
only the EBA group really has substantial preferential access, and that preferential 
margin is halved once one takes into account that the EU is also granting 
preferences to other exporters that are competing with ASEAN countries in the EU 
market (columns 2 and 3). Thus the unadjusted 11% preferential margin is reduced 
to around 5% when factoring in the preferences that are also granted to competing 
countries.  Second, a different pattern emerges for the GSP group (Brunei, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam). While the unadjusted 
preference margin ranges from 0.1% (Brunei) to 2.6% (Vietnam), the adjusted one 
is always null or negative, ranging from 0 (Malaysia, Philippines) to -1.1% (Brunei). 
Thus, the GSP group is in effect penalized by the current system of EU preferences. 
Third, Singapore’s market access is little affected by the EU’s preferential policies. 
This is because almost half of Singapore’s exports face a zero MFN tariff in the EU. 
 
Columns 4 and 5 quantify how preferential access would be affected by the 
implementation of the proposed ASEAN-EU FTA. The largest beneficiaries are 
Vietnam and Thailand, both in the GSP group, the large gains in market access 
reflecting the fact that a small share of their exports face zero MFN tariffs in the EU 
(see table 1). On the other hand, the small gain for Indonesia and Malaysia reflects 
a concentration of their exports on zero-MFN tariff lines. Market access gains are 
estimated to be cut in half or more for several countries because of market access 
granted by the EU to other trade partners competing with ASEAN members. 
 
The EBA group is the least affected since the unadjusted preferential margin is 
strictly identical with or without the FTA as they already benefit from zero tariffs on 
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their exports to the EU. However, to the extent that they compete with non-EBA 
ASEAN members, they incur a loss of market access . Comparing columns 3 and 5 
indicates that EBA members lose about ¼ of their preferential margin to GSP ASEAN 
members.  
 
But negotiators would likely want to know more about the first-round impact of this 
change in market access since a high preferential margin on products that count 
little, reflects a small “value” for these preferences.  They might also want to know if 
the change in market access resulting from the FTA mostly affects HS-10 products 
with negligible market share (nothing can be surmised about developments at the 
extensive margin from an impact analysis based on current market shares). Or they 
might want to know if products that are candidates for exemption from preferences 
during the negotiation, count a lot. 
 
To answer these questions, the most disaggregated data is necessary since it is at 
this level that exemptions are negotiated. Figure 1 proposes a “new” representation 
of the distribution of preferential access across products. It reports the cumulative 
preferential margins (unadjusted and adjusted) for the top 100 products ranked by 
decreasing shares in total exports for each ASEAN country’s sales to the EU in 
2004. More precisely, figure 1 reports for each export line k of the Top 100 export 
HS-10 digit items to the EU25 in 2004 according to: 
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with cumulative export shares  ranked in decreasing order, i.e. 1k kx x +>  and N is the 
total number of product exported towards the EU. Note that UnadjkT is normalized so 
as to fall in the range [0; 100%] over the top 100 export HS-10 digit items. To ease 
the comparison, adjkT is also normalized by the cumulative unadjusted preferential 
margins of the Top 100 export.4 Hence, as indicated in (0.4), adjkT is bounded 
between 0 and 1 on the up side but not bounded on the down side.  
 
Given that the sum of the value of exports for the top 100 products is very close to 
total exports (except for 3 GSP countries and Singapore), and our selection of 
normalization, in effect, figure 1 traces “Lorenz-like” curves in the 
export/preference-margin space. Thus, just like a standard Lorenz curve depicting 
the extent of income inequality, the more convex the curves, the more skewed 
preferences are towards products that count little in the total value of exports. The 
curves, however, are not Lorenz curves: first the cumulative export shares do not 
add up to the same total (this is a deliberate choice to show the market share 
covered by the top 100 products for each country) so that the slopes of the curves 
are not strictly comparable, and the shares on the horizontal axis are not the same 
(e.g. quintiles or deciles). 
                     
4 
Unadj
kT cannot be normalized in the 0-100 range since 
nτ% can be positive or negative. 
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As a reference, suppose that each product had a preferential access proportional to 
its share in export value.  Then the solid unadjusted black line would bisect the 
graph (i.e. correspond to the 450 for the countries where the top 100 products 
exhaust all exports to the EU) Hence, once the products are sorted in decreasing 
order (in terms of export value), the more convex is the solid black curve below the 
diagonal, the more preferential access is biased towards products with small export 
shares to the EU. 
 
Following the presentation in table 2, figure 1 is broken down into two groups: EBA 
(and Singapore for contrast) in figure 1a and the GSP group in figure 1b. In each 
graph, the solid lines depict the export-preferential-margin relation under the 
current EU preferential regime while the dashed lines trace the corresponding 
export-preferential-margin relation under the counterfactual regime with an 
ASEAN-EU FTA. 
 
Before comparing the curves across countries and across preferential regimes, 
observe a common pattern in all graphs: the steepness of the curves as one 
approaches the last 10 products or so. Those are the products that would gain the 
most preferential access but they are also currently negligible in the export basket, 
never reaching 1/10 of one percent of export value. Indeed, if one excludes Brunei 
and Singapore, only Thailand and Vietnam would get non-negligible preferential 
access for current top 5 products (meat and motor vehicles for Thailand, and bicycles 
and men’s cotton shirts for Vietnam). This pattern reflects the workings of political-
economy motives in the determination of rent transfers granted through preferential 
market access: tariff preferences are granted to sectors and products in which they 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2008.28 
 
 17 
face little competition, i.e. usually to sectors and products that export negligible 
amounts to the EU.  
 
Figures 1a and b here: Cumulative Exports Against Cumulative Preferences 
 
Turn now to the different patterns. Start with the current situation, i.e. the “solid” 
gray and black lines. As an example, take Cambodia, the first country in the EBA 
group (figure 1.a). The curve is very convex indicating that the most important 
exports do not receive any preferences. Indeed, the most important product 
(Jerseys, pullovers, cardigan and waistcoats) exported by Cambodia represents 
24.2% of its total exports to EU.  Note also that the curves usually trace a 
continuous smooth line with no clear horizontal “steps”, reflecting the fact that (in 
contrast with Singapore) EBA countries, only export a few tariff lines with zero 
MFN tariffs (i.e. zero preferential margins).5 The short length of the horizontal lines 
indicates that the corresponding export shares with zero MFN tariffs are small.  
Overall, the shape of the curves for the EBA group stands in sharp contrast with the 
corresponding ones for the GSP countries depicted in figure 1b.which are initially 
flat and close to the horizontal axis indicating no preferential axis for the major 
export products. 
                     
5
 A “vertical jump” in the curve would then reflect a large preference for the corresponding product, 
and inspection of these “Lorenz” curves can be used to spot  “important” products in terms of 
preferential margins. This is clear for the adjusted market schedule for Thailand in figure 1b. It 
registers a large negative “vertical jump” at around 30% of export value. It reflects the large value for 
the MFN tariff (134% applied tariff for the line “Fresh, chilled, frozen or dried roots and tubers of 
manioc” (0.9% of total value exports). This leads to a jump in the adjusted preferential margin of -
46.6%. Even if this line were excluded, the overall pattern is negative and decreasing. 
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Compare next these unadjusted curves with the corresponding (gray) adjusted 
curves. The adjusted export/preferential-margin curves are always lower, the 
distance between the two indicating the extent of erosion due to competition by 
other preference-receiving countries. The adjusted curves however are still positive 
for the EBA group, reflecting the aggregate estimates in table 3. Except for the 
relative importance of the most important export product, the shapes of the figures 
for Cambodia, Lao and Myanmar are remarkably similar. In sum, the patterns 
described in the figure reveal that the ASEAN-EBA group is quite homogeneous in 
terms of preferential access to the EU. This group competes strongly with ASEAN 
GSP beneficiaries. This is indicated by the convex broken line in figure 1a which 
captures the loss of preferential access coming from preferences granted to other 
GSP ASEAN members under the proposed ASEAN-EU FTA. 
 
Finally, note the striking contrast between the EBA members and the only MFN 
country (Singapore) shown in the bottom right of the figure 1a. First, the adjusted 
preferential margin is always negative since it is an MFN exporter. Also, the 
adjusted preferential margin curve has several long horizontal strips. This is 
because the negative adjusted preferential margins occurs for the 5 most important 
products (representing 40% of the total export value) and then only for products in 
the range beyond the 38th product.  Between these two product ranges 
(corresponding to around 33% of the export value ranging from 40 to 73%), 
Singapore’s exports to the EU face a zero MFN tariff. 
 
The schedules in figure 1b show that the GSP group is far more heterogeneous, 
signaling that one might expect very different stances on market access issues 
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during the negotiations. Thus, Brunei’s first 5 export products (the first being 
“articles of jewelry and parts thereof, of precious metal other than silver” which 
accounts for 94% of total export value) receive no preferences. The Philippines also 
gets quasi zero preference up to 68% of the exports to the EU. A similar pattern 
holds for Malaysia and Indonesia. The situation is more favorable for Thailand and 
Vietnam, since only the first 10% of exports do not benefit from some preferential 
access. All countries lose  
 
Comparing the unadjusted and adjusted schedules for EBA and GSP countries 
suggests that the 3 EBA countries would form a natural negotiating entity with 
similar interests while this is not the case for the GSP group, even when Brunei is 
excluded. The very steep curves for the Philippines and Indonesia also suggest that 
these countries have strong interests in a few products, although these products 
carry little weight in their respective export basket.  
 
5. Factoring in Rules of Origin 
 
Rules of Origin (RoO) are an integral part of all reciprocal (i.e. FTAs) and non-
reciprocal (i.e. GSP) trading arrangements falling short of a Customs Union. Their 
raison-d’être is to prevent trade deflection. In general, they turn out to be complex 
and modify sensibly market access because of the costs that are incurred by exporters 
having to comply with these rules. The EU applies a so-called “single-list” to all 
partners trading on a preferential basis with over 500 different product-specific rules 
of origin (PSRO) defined at the HS-6 level. These rules are complex and they certainly 
modify the extent of market access resulting from preferences differently across 
products and partners. Not surprisingly, the ASEAN negotiators would wish the 
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negotiations to lead to a set of simple RoO as in e.g. AFTA where originating status is 
met so long as non-originating value does not exceed 60% of the value of the product 
value.6  The question then is how do these RoO modify the extent of market access 
and how can one summarize their effects. 
 
The complexity of these PSRO has been conveniently summarized by an overall 
ordinal restrictiveness “R-index” constructed at the product line level so that 
increasing values of the index represent a more restrictive PSRO. The ordinal index 
takes values in the range 1 7ir≤ ≤  so that ( 1)ir =  corresponds to a PSRO that is easy 
to satisfy and ( 7)ir =  to one that is difficult to satisfy.7  Trade-weighted average values 
of the index for each ASEAN country are reported in the last column of table 2. It is 
immediately clear that the EBA group benefiting from greater market access face, 
overall, stricter RoO, and hence is subject to more preference erosion because of the 
costs associated with compliance.  
                     
6
 ASEAN-EU report (2006) p.10, paragraph 3.15 states that “Negotiations to define, simple, 
transparent and liberal RoOs rank high on the priority list”  
7 For example a value ( )4ir =  corresponds either to a change of tariff classification at the Heading 
(HS-4 level) , a VC requirement limiting non-originating inputs to 60% of the ex-works price, or a 
wholly obtained criterion accompanied by an exclusion and a technical requirement. At the lower end  
( )1ir = , corresponds to a no change of  tariff line heading, or an allowance added to one of the 
following single criteria: (exclusion, CTC at the sub-heading level, or wholly obtained). At the more 
restrictive end ( )7ir =  usually the PSRO consists of three requirements including a technical 
requirement, and the CTC must take place at the Heading or Chapter level. See Cadot et al. 2006 for a 
description and application of the R-index. 
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One approach to estimating their restrictiveness is to estimate if, after controlling for 
the level of preferential access, utilization rates are lower for tariff lines with higher 
values for the PSRO index. Such correlations carried out by Cadot et al. (2007) for 
ASEAN and other beneficiaries on preferences in the EU market show that this is 
indeed the case. However, because there is so much heterogeneity in the 
determinants of utilization rates at the tariff line level, it is hard to appreciate how 
such estimates are affected by omitted variable bias. Hence, to keep in the spirit of 
descriptive statistics used here, table 3 classifies products into three categories 
according to the extent of (unadjusted) preferential access to see if there is any 
correlation between the restrictiveness of RoO and the extent of preferential access. 
For both ASEAN groups, but especially for the EBA group, preferential margins 
coincide with tariff lines that have a more restrictive R-index indicating that where 
margins are substantial, proving origin is more difficult in the sense of having to meet 
multiple requirements, and hence is likely to be costly. High compliance costs for 
EBA beneficiaries would confirm that the low preference uptake for this group would 
be due to restrictive RoO.8 
 
Table 3 here: Preferential Margins and the PSRO index 
 
                     
8  For 2004, and for the ASEAN EBA members, the utilization of preferences in the EU market was 
around 30% for preferential margins above 5% and also for preference margins above 10%  By 
contrast, the corresponding utilization rates were higher for the GSP group and around 80% (see 
Carrère et al. (2007), table 3.1) . Although the composition of exports differs, this also suggests that 
compliance costs are higher for EBA than GSP countries. 
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It is also informative to ask how ASEAN countries would compare under the 
proposed FTA when lined up against other EU preference-receiving competitors. 
Figure 2 plots the results of a smoothing regression between the stringency of the 
RoO index and the preferential margin for 2004 for the 219 beneficiaries of EU 
preferences subject to RoO.9 ASEAN countries, as well as India and China, are 
emphasized in the scatter plot. As expected, the regression line is positive, confirming 
the results in table 3. Even though the fit is not very tight, all ASEAN countries 
appear to be significantly above the regression line (the farthest above the fitted line 
being the ASEAN-EBA group). This striking pattern suggests that these countries are 
facing more restrictive RoO than competing countries benefitting from the same 
preferential access. The two exceptions are Singapore, not significantly different from 
the sample mean, and Vietnam, significantly lower in terms of RoO restrictiveness 
given its preferential margin. It is thus not surprising from inspection of figure 2 that, 
from the point of view of ASEAN, as mentioned above, the protocol for the ASEAN-
EU FTA stipulates that simple and transparent RoO should be a priority in the 
negotiations! 
 
Figure 2 here:  Restrictiveness index of PSRO versus export-weighted preferential 
margin 
 
                     
9
 Smoothing regression is an OLS estimation over moving windows allowing for a potential non-
linearity in the relation. See Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) for further description and an application  
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6  Final Thoughts  
 
The market-access measures in this paper applied to the ASEAN-EU FTA suggest 
very different market access across countries when countries negotiate an FTA with a 
major trading partner like the EU which has an extensive preferential policy. Given 
the diversity in ASEAN membership, this is not surprising since at least one member 
belongs to each one of the three circles characterizing EU trade policy, but the 
patterns revealed here are likely to appear in other country groupings like the EPAs 
negotiating FTAs with the EU . In the case of ASEAN, even the EBA beneficiaries’ 
effective market access is cut in half to about 5% once EU preferential access to other 
partners is taken into account. Taking into account preferences granted to other 
partners by the EU reveals that all the members (except Vietnam) in the  GSP group 
are penalized under the current system of preferences Likewise, moving to FTA status 
would result in a loss of about ¼ of their preference margin for EBA members to 
other (i.e. GSP) ASEAN members getting free-trade status in the EU as a result of the 
FTA.  The small aggregate value of preferences captured by the “Lorenz-like” curves 
in the export/preference-margin space show clearly that preferences are always 
received for products with very small export shares. A comparison of the export 
share/preference- margin relation across countries shows that the EBA group is quite 
homogenous, but not so for the GSP group which shows heterogeneity and likely 
strong conflicts of interests in the negotiations as far as market access issues are 
concerned. 
 
The paper also develops simple measures to show how market access is further 
eroded once rules of origin (RoO) necessary to satisfy originating status under any 
FTA are taken into account. As already shown in other work, products benefitting 
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from maximum access (i.e. entering tariff-free in the EU for product categories with 
tariff peaks) also face the stiffest compliance rules. As a result, even if the same RoO 
are applied to all partners, because of differences in the commodity composition of 
their exports, trading partners are affected differentially by RoO. The estmates in the 
paper show that, for a given preferential margin, relative to other countries also 
receiving preferential trading status in the EU, ASEAN members face tougher RoO 
than other EU preferential trading partners.  
 
In conclusion, it is noteworthy that many ex-ante assessments of the welfare effects of 
preferential market access tend to show gains from reciprocal preferential tariff 
reductions. On the other hand, the outcomes of negotiations indicate tensions 
resulting in many exceptions to full market access. For example, in recognition of the 
different levels of development among its members, in all its FTA negotiations, 
ASEAN has individual exception lists. The tensions in the current EPA negotiations 
also suggest divergence of interests across member countries in the same negotiation 
group, let alone across negotiation groups. The measures developed here and applied 
to the proposed ASEAN-EU FTA help understand better why “one size does not fit 
all” applies to market access aspects of the many current preferential trade 
negotiations and why tensions are so frequent. 
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Table 1: Distribution of EU applied tariff, HS-10, 2004 
 
  Nber of HS-10 lines with an applied tariff  of 
  0 ]0-5] ]5-10] ]10-25] ]25-50] ]50-100] >100 
Total Nber of 
tariff lines 
Cumulativ
e share of 
the Top 50 
exports to 
EU25 
Overall / EU market 2172   4201   3476   1768   278   175   75   12145 
  
MFN status                                 
Singapore 864 (44%) 1867 (8%) 740 (48%) 406 (1%) 9 (0%) 7 (0%) 2 (0%) 3895 77.4% 
GSP status                                 
Brunei 105 (34%) 3 (63%) 37 (3%) 0   0   0   0   144 99.2% 
Indonesia 2081 (63%) 759 (12%) 984 (22%) 76 (3%) 6 (0%) 2 (0%) 0   3943 54.5% 
Malaysia 2449 (81%) 552 (8%) 509 (8%) 374 (2%) 5 (0%) 3 (0%) 0   3934 58.5% 
Philippines 1725 (93%) 347 (2%) 565 (5%) 71 (1%) 4 (0%) 1 (0%) 0   2748 81.2% 
Thailand 2436 (58%) 826 (13%) 887 (14%) 822 (14%) 22 (0%) 11 (0%) 3 (1%) 5049 46.7% 
Vietnam 1351 (40%) 416 (25%) 669 (19%) 92 (16%) 5 (0%) 1 (0%) 0   2602 56.9% 
EBA status                                 
Cambodia 407 (100%) 0   0   0   0   0   0   407 88.2% 
Laos 259 (100%) 0   0   0   0   0   0   258 88.1% 
Myanmar 485 (100%) 0   0   0   0   0   0   486 84.5% 
Note: The corresponding % of total lines in parenthesis. 
Source : authors’ computations. 
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Table 2: 
Preferential Margins, adjusted and Unadjusted under Different 
Preferential Schemes 
(Weighted by the export value at the HS-10 level) 
  
Current average 
Pref. Margin 
Gain/Loss in Pref. margin 
from implementing an 
ASEAN-EU FTA 
RoO 
index 
  
Value of 
Pref. 
(millions 
euros) a/ 
Unadj. Adj. Unadj. Adj.   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MFN status       
Singapore 0.0 0.0 -0.3 3.5 0.9 3.9 
GSP status       
Brunei 0.0 0.1 -1.1 2.2 1.5 4.4 
Indonesia 29.5 1.0 -0.4 2.7 1.7 4.0 
Malaysia 21.6 0.7 0.0 1.2 0.6 4.1 
Philippines 8.2 0.5 0.0 0.6 0.4 4.3 
Thailand 21.2 0.9 -0.6 4.8 2.1 4.4 
Vietnam 28.6 2.6 0.2 4.7 3.1 3.3 
EBA status       
Cambodia 17.2 12.0 5.5 0.0 -1.4 6.0 
Lao 3.5 10.9 5.3 0.0 -1.2 5.8 
Myanmar 0.1 10.6 4.8 0.0 -1.0 6.0 
 
Notes: Estimates in percentage points for 2004 (margins weighted by exports) 
 
a/ Value of actual preferences: ( ), , ,MFN k PREF k PREF ki i ik t t M−∑ ,  PREFM being the 
import value to EU that actually enters under preferential status. 
 
Source : authors’ computations. 
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Figure 1.a: EBA group a/ and Singapore 
Cumulative Exports Against Cumulative Preferences b/ 
Top 100 export HS-10 digit items to the EU25  in 2004 
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Notes: 
a/ For the EBA group, current unadjusted and unadjusted FTA curves coincide. See table 3, col. 5. 
b/ the pref. margins are normalized so that the cumulative unadjusted preferential margin under EU-ASEAN  
FTA is 100% for the top 100 products. Solid (dashed) lines correspond to unadjusted (adjusted) export-
preferential-margin relations. Black lines correspond to current situation; Gray lines to those under the 
proposed ASEAN-EU FTA 
 
Source : authors’ computations. 
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Figure 1.b: GSP group 
Cumulative Exports Against Cumulative Preferences a/ 
Top 100 export HS-10 digit items to the EU25  in 2004 
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Source : authors’ computations. 
Notes: a/ Preferential margins are normalized so that the cumulative unadjusted preferential margin under 
EU-ASEAN  FTA is 100% for the top 100 products. Solid (dashed) lines correspond to unadjusted 
(adjusted) export-preferential-margin relations Black lines correspond to current situation; gray lines to 
those under the proposed ASEAN-EU FTA 
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Table 3: Preferential Margins and the PSRO index 
 
R-Index valuea 
  GSP-92  
(2.4%)a 
ASEAN  
GSP-9(2.9%)a 
ASEAN 
EBA(3) 
(8.8%)a 
Preferential Margin peaksb 4.7 (1,779) 5.8 (990) 6.1 (522) 
Low Preferential Marginb 3.8(23,253) 4.0 (4,223) 3.9 (343) 
Total number of tariff linesc 4.3 (99,262) 4.5(19,242) 5.1 (1,148) 
Notes: 
Number of tariff lines are indicated in parenthesis next to average value of R-index 
a/ Average preferential margin in parenthesis. 
b/,See text for the definition of the R-index 
c/ For the two GSP groups, the tariff peaks are computed for all tariff lines that exceed 3 times (are one 
third of) the average preferential margin given in parenthesis. For the EBA group, peaks are defined 
for tariff lines with preference margins in excess of 12% and low margins for tariff lines below 4% 
preferential margins.  
 
Source : authors’ computations. 
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Figure 2:  Restrictiveness index of PSRO versus export-weighted preferential margin  
 
 Zoom 
 
Source: authors’ computations. 
Notes: Smoothing Regression using exported weighted data for the PSRO index and 
for the (unadjusted) preferential Margin, 219 countries, 2004 
 
 
 
